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REGULATION, DEREGULATION, AND HAPPINESS
Jeffrey L. Harrison*
INTRODUCTION
It was not uncommon in the latter third of the last century for law
students to take a general course on economic regulation. It is best
described as the substantive side of administrative law. I first took' and
then taught the course until enrollments dwindled-perhaps because of
the development of more specifically focused courses. 2 In addition, I
authored a casebook with Paul Verkuil and Thomas Morgan, 3 first titled
The Economic Regulation of BusineSS4 and later Regulation and
Deregulation.5 Coincidentally, Paul Verkuil and I have also authored,
quite independently, articles about happiness. 6 Happiness (or subjective
well-being (SWB) or experienced utility) may seem like an odd topic
for those interested in the regulation of business but, in fact, they are
natural complements7 : Ultimately (or perhaps hopefully) regulation
should satisfy a test of whether it improves the quality of life. Often
this means employing one measure of efficiency or another. The new
interest in happiness is driven in large measure by dissatisfaction with
traditional notions of economic efficiency. Thus, it is natural for those
interested in regulation to also be intrigued by the potential happiness
research may hold.
* Stephen C. O'Connell Chair and Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Florida.
Paul Verkuil was my teacher.
2 The decline in the course's popularity is unfortunate. The course touches many bases to
which every lawyer should have some exposure, including economics, jurisprudence, and history.
3 Thomas Morgan is now at George Washington University.
4 Thomas Morgan was the single author of the first edition of CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS (1976). In addition, Paul Verkuil and David Boies co-
authored PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1977) before Paul and I joined Thomas Morgan on the
second edition of ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1985).
5 REGULATION AND DEREGULATION appeared as two editions, one in 1997 and one in 2004.
6 Jeffrey L. Harrison, Happiness, Efficiency and the Promise of Decisional Equity: From
Outcome to Process, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 935, 955-57 (2009); Martin E.P. Seligman, Paul R. Verkuil
& Terry H. Kang, Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 33 (2001).
7 None of the books authored by Thomas Morgan, Paul Verkuil or myself address the issue
directly, but some of the reading included in the books can be seen as addressing the issue
indirectly or with a different label.
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Happiness, in general, is in many respects the topic du jour. A
great deal of theoretical and empirical work has been devoted to its
dissection.8 Studies of happiness have crossed over to law, and the
result is an addition to the long list of "law and" interdisciplinary areas.
In fact, in 2010, Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein presented an excellent
book of readings called Law and Happiness.9 Peter Henry Huang has
written the definitive survey of law and happiness literature.' 0 My own
writing has reflected on the promise of happiness research and the
difficulties of implementing its teachings." Most of the
interdisciplinary work evaluates the potential impact of happiness on
policies or programs.12 For example, in response to evidence that
hosting large-scale sports events, such as the Olympics or the Super
Bowl, is not an unqualified economic success,13 work is now being
conducted that alters the focus to considerations of happiness. The
teachings of happiness scholarship have yet to be applied to the
traditional rationales for business regulation or to questions of how
8 See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND
THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985); BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND
ECONOMICS: How THE ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT HUMAN WELL-BEING (2002);
DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006); JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS
HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN ANCIENT WISDOM (2006); JENNIFER MICHAEL
HECHT, THE HAPPINESS MYTH: WHY WHAT WE THINK IS RIGHT IS WRONG (2007); RICHARD
LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE (2005); MATTHIEU RICARD, HAPPINESS:
A GUIDE TO DEVELOPING LIFE'S MOST IMPORTANT SKILL (Jesse Browner trans., Little, Brown
& Co. 2006); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective
Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155 (2005); Richard A. Easterlin, Explaining Happiness, 100 PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 11176 (2003) [hereinafter Easterlin, Explaining Happiness]; Richard A.
Easterlin, Income and Happiness: Toward a Unified Theory, Ill ECON. J. 465 (2001) [hereinafter
Easterlin, Income and Happiness]; Richard A. Easterlin, Will Raising the Incomes ofAll Increase
the Happiness ofAll?, 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 35 (1995) [hereinafter Easterlin, Happiness of
All]; INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991);
Tiffany A. Ito & John T. Cacioppo, The Psychophysiology of Utility Appraisals, in WELL-BEING:
THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 470 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999); Richard
E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of Happiness: Reactions to
Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 527 (2003). For an excellent selection of
readings, see Ito & Cacioppo, supra.
9 LAW AND HAPPINESS (Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 2010) [hereinafter
HAPPINESS).
10 Peter Henry Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SC. 405
(2010).
11 But see Harrison, supra note 6.
12 See, e.g., Paul Dolan & Matthew P. White, How Can Measures of Subjective Well-Being
Be Used to Inform Public Policy?, 2 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 71 (2007); Peter H. Huang,
Authentic Happiness, Self-Knowledge and Legal Policy, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 755 (2008);
Anthony Vitarelli, Note, Happiness Metrics in Federal Rulemaking, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 115
(2010).
13 See, e.g., Philip K. Porter & Deborah Fletcher, The Economic Impact of the Olympic
Games: Ex Ante Predictions and Ex Post Reality, 22 J. SPORTS MGMT. 470 (2008).
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regulation could be altered, if at all, by considerations of happiness.14
This is the topic to which most of what follows is devoted.15
First, a compressed survey of the issues raised by the examination
and application of happiness is presented. Included are descriptions of
the tensions within happiness scholarship. Second, the potential for
happiness to provide useful regulatory guidance is assessed in the
context of the four basic rationales for regulation as described in the
book Regulation and Deregulation.16
I. HAPPINESS: A BRIEF SURVEY
As noted above, the impetus for an application of happiness to
legal policy and regulation is generated in large measure by
dissatisfaction with conventional measures of efficiency.' 7 Whether it
is Pareto efficiency18 or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,19 the idea of
efficiency turns on observing choices 20 people make 21 and not on how
much better they feel or how they actually are after that choice. 22 In
other words, conventional efficiency concepts are assessed ex ante
while happiness is assessed ex post with respect to the actual decision-
14 It is not clear that regulation and policy are entirely separable. In this Article, regulation is
more focused than policy and largely involves the implementation of policy.
15 Perhaps it could just as easily be viewed as a question of what the books on economic
regulation from the past twenty-five years would have looked like had the authors known then
what they know now. This is not to say that older regulatory standards are inconsistent with
happiness. In fact, as explained below, there are many instances in which happiness has been
promoted without being a direct goal of regulation.
16 See JEFFREY HARRISON, THOMAS MORGAN & PAUL VERKUIL, REGULATION AND
DEREGULATION 121-22 (2d ed. 2004).
17 In their article, Back to Bentham? Explorations ofExperienced Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375
(1997), Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker and Rakesh Sarin distinguish experienced utility and
decision utility.
18 According to the concept of Pareto efficiency, efficiency is increased when at least one
person is made better off and no one is made worse off. See JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES
THEEUWES, LAW AND ECONOMICS 26-28 (2008).
19 The Kaldor-Hicks standard is met when those made better off could compensate those
made worse off. The term "potential Pareto Superior" is an apt description because no actual
compensation is required. Id. at 28-31. For a description of the origins of the standard, see
Harrison, supra note 6.
20 These measures cannot be completely discounted. Repeat purchases suggest that the
happiness or satisfaction of the decision-maker with the first purchase was high.
21 Or, as discussed infra, it turns on observing the decision they would make if transaction
costs did not interfere.
22 The distinction here is intentional. There is a difference between how one feels (subjective
well-being) and the actual welfare of a person. The latter refers to objective measures of mental
and physican health.
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making. 23 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky offer another useful
way of describing this. They distinguish decisional utility (ex ante)
from experienced utility (ex post)24 and argue that "experienced utility
is both measurable and empirically distinct from decision utility." 25
Measurement of actual happiness can be done through "experience
sampling" or "day reconstruction." In the former, participants report
their level of pleasure on an ongoing basis. 26  In the latter case,
participants recall the events of the day before.27
Having the capacity to measure, as described by Kahneman and
Tversky, does not mean that the information can be put to use in a
meaningful way.28 Additionally, it does not mean ex ante and ex post
can be viewed as unrelated. Today's expectations are often formed by
prior experiences. Thus, for repeat transactions, the measurement of
future outcomes based on choices cannot be completely discounted. In
fact, perhaps the most promising potential of happiness theory lies in
closing the gap between decisional and experienced utility.
A. Utilitarian Related Problems
It is ironic that the first problem happiness proponents confront is
whether happiness is any different from utilitarianism and its problems.
For example, if maximum experienced happiness (or utility) is the goal,
is success measured by assessing the average or total amount of
happiness? Under the latter possibility, many people who are
moderately satisfied would be preferable to a smaller population of
people experiencing a very high level of utility. More important is the
question of the utility monster's counterpart-the happiness monster.
Under a strict happiness standard, a proponent would have to concede
that harm to others is permitted if the happiness experienced by the
harmer exceeds the displeasure of the person harmed. As will be
23 Perhaps the most influential factor in shifting the emphasis toward expected, or ex ante,
utility is Paul Samuelson's concept of revealed preferences, which maintains that, in effect, we
know what people prefer by observing choices. According to Samuelson, the theory is "freed
from any vestigial traces of the utility concept." Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory
of Consumer's Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA 61, 71 (1938).
24 Kahneman et al., supra note 17, at 375-76.
25 Id. at 376.
26 Daniel Kahneman et al., Toward National Well-Being Accounts, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 429,
430-33 (2004).
27 Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experiences: The
Day Reconstruction Method, 306 SCIENCE 1776 (2004).
28 One might instinctively think in terms of compensating those who are affected by
something that makes them unhappy. This may not achieve the purpose of restoring happiness
because the relationship between happiness and income is not clear. See infra text accompanying
notes 29-30.
[Vol. 32:62372
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discussed below, there are responses to this, but they deviate from a true
happiness standard.
B. Adaptations
A second complexity results from people's capacity to adapt.
There are actually two versions of this. One is more directly related to
happiness studies and involves hedonic adaptation. When this process
takes place, a person who undergoes a very unpleasant or pleasant
experience returns to nearly the ex ante level of happiness in time. For
example, a serious health problem may result in a decrease in happiness
but, under this theory, those affected tend to eventually return to their
prior levels of happiness. 29  The implications of this theory are
enormous. In fact, one application of the theory posits that typical tort
damages result in overcompensation because the long-term impact of
injury is less severe than assumed when fixing damages.30
An older area of study, relative deprivation, intersects with the
more recent studies of happiness but has not been fully addressed in that
context. 31 Under a theory of relative deprivation, people tend to gauge
how well off they are by making comparisons. More importantly, their
comparisons tend to be with reference groups that exist in conditions
similar to their own. For example, a working-class person might not
experience a sense of unhappiness if he or she sees a wealthy person
driving an expensive car but may experience unhappiness if he or she
sees another working-class person driving a new car. In essence, people
adapt in a way that reduces their sense of dissatisfaction or
dissonance.32
The impact of these phenomena puts into play the legitimacy of
feelings of happiness-the normative basis for relying on happiness as a
measure of well-being. For example, to some extent, those who do not
29 See, e.g., Richard E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of
Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 527 (2003).
30 See Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death, Happiness, and the Calculation
of Compensatory Damages, in HAPPINESS, supra note 9, at 217.
31 But see Harrison, supra note 6.
32 See generally Faye Crosby, Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to Miller, Bolce,
and Halligan, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 103 (1979); Ted Robert Gurr, Sources of Rebellion in
Western Societies: Some Quantitative Evidence, 391 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
128, 129 (1970); William H. Panning, Inequality, Social Comparison, and Relative Deprivation,
77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1983). In many respects adaptations of this nature seem similar to
"prospect theory" as formulated by Kahneman and Tversky. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979),
and indeed, the authors suggest as much. Id. at 288. There also seems to be a similarity between
adaptation and the endowment effect. See generally HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 18, at
229-30. In both instances, there is a tendency for people to maintain a status quo position.
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experience a feeling of deprivation have learned to accept less. 33 And
those who experience a serious injury or loss may recalibrate their
expectations. 34 They may be asked if they are happy but the question
they "hear" is: "Are you happy given your loss?" If they say they are
happy but would much prefer to be back in the position they were in,
the conclusion that they are as happy or almost as happy as they once
were is thin.35
C. Subjective Well-Being or Something Else
One question that arises in the context of happiness proposals is
whether happiness is all that matters. 36 In this instance the reference is
to subjective happiness. It is probably essential to adopt a version of
happiness other than subjective happiness to avoid falling into a
utilitarian analysis. One version of the "something else" point of view
accepts the possibility that what makes one feel happy may not be in
one's long run best interest or consistent with the subjective well-being
of others. One formulation of this concern limits the measure of well-
being to those things consistent with "prudence." 37 This has been
described as the difference between "the good life" and "living a life
that is good for the individual concerned." 38 This deviation from
subjective well-being makes sense from one point of view but infuses
the analysis with judgments about taste. For example, today people
continue to smoke even though the evidence is overwhelming that
smoking is dangerous. The "good for the individual" standard comes
33 See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 Wm. &
MARY L. REv. 445, 465 (1994).
34 See Peter A. Ubel & George Loewenstein, Pain and Suffering Awards: They Should Not Be
(Just) About Pain and Suffering, in HAPPINESS, supra note 9, at 195, 199-201; Peter A. Ubel et
al., What is Perfect Health to an 85 Year Old: Evidence For Scale Recalibration in Subjective
Health Ratings, 43 MED. CARE 1054 (2005); see also Jeffrey L. Harrison, Piercing Pareto
Superiority: Real People and the Obligations ofLegal Theory, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997).
35 See Cass Sunstein, Illusory Losses, in HAPPINESS, supra note 9, at 157, 177. Sunstein
observes that "there is no evidence of recalibration." Id. at 165. Work by Ubel and others
suggests the opposite. See Peter A. Ubel et al., supra note 34.
36 Perhaps the most well-known thought experiment in this regard is Robert Nozick's
experience machine. Once you enter it you will feel happy without exception. Or, at least that is
how you would feel. Nozick argues that it is unlikely to have many takers because there is more
that is important to us than happiness. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 42-45
(1974). More recently, philosopher David Sosa distinguished between happiness and experience.
See David Sosa, The Spoils of Happiness, N.Y. TIMES OPENIONATOR (Oct. 6, 2010,
7:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/the-spoils-of-happiness/?scp-l&sq=
nozick&st=cse.
37 Paul Dolan & Tessa Peasgood, Measuring Well-Being for Public Policy: Preferences or
Experiences, in HAPPINESS supra note 9, at 5, 11.
3 8 Id
2374 [Vol. 32:6
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close to one in which the preferences that others have for another
person's preferences carry considerable weight.
Another approach that helps distinguish happiness from
utilitarianism involves "capability" as formulated by Amartya Sen.39
One way to understand the concept is to think in terms of set-point
happiness-the idea that people are destined to return eventually to an
ex ante level of happiness after either very pleasing or damaging events.
For example, suppose an avid skier is involved in an accident that
makes skiing no longer possible. Further suppose that three years after
the accident the person reports being as happy as he or she ever was.
Aside from recalibration issues, there seems to be something amiss
about a view of happiness that does not account for the loss. In effect, a
capability has been lost. If one thinks of tort recoveries as a method of
requiring those who harm others to internalize the harm they cause, that
goal seems to fall short if lost capabilities are not accounted for. In fact,
if the same person could be asked before the fact, "What would it take
to compensate you for never skiing again?," the answer is likely to be
quite different. Perhaps the cost of harm is better assessed before there
is an adjustment. In short, an evaluation based on subjective well-being
may not fully account for the loss of capabilities.
D. Practical Difficulties
All of the above concerns are largely about how to measure
happiness. The dominant view is that subjective happiness is perhaps
unsupportable as an ethical matter or, at least, does not properly
recognize prudence and capabilities. A further concern is when to
assess happiness. 40 This problem can be understood by reference to
common experiences. One may be elated with a purchase and regret it
later. One may find an experience unpleasant at the time and then take
great pride in having survived or accomplished a difficult task later.
Virtually everyone can relate to enjoying oneself during a meal or
festive event and then waking up the next morning feeling quite
unhappy.
39 See AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 353-69 (1997); AMARTYA
SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985). The same themes have been advanced by Martha
Nussbaum. For a collection of readings edited by and written by Professors Sen and Nussbaum,
see THE QUALITY OF LIFE (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
40 Other factors that may be of concern are those that typically are associated with
conventional economic analysis. Specifically, are individuals rational and self-interested? An
effort to maximize happiness seems equally dependent on these assumptions. See Harrison,
supra note 6, at 947-52.
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Experience sampling, pioneered by Daniel Kahneman, illustrates
the problems created when time is injected into an analysis of
happiness. 41 In this process, subjects record their level of pleasure
contemporaneously. That assessment can be compared with how
subjects reflect on the events of the previous time period. This is a
comparison of "instant utility" with "remembered utility." As discussed
earlier, perhaps the most important distinction the authors make is
between "decisional" and "experienced" utility. "Experienced" refers to
actual outcomes while "decisional" refers to the weight expected utility
plays in decision making.42 The authors note that decisional utility is
what economists generally employ today but make the case that
experienced utility is measurable. 43
One excellent example of the difficulty of measuring happiness
involves the immersion of the hands of experimental subjects in very
cold water. In one trial, a hand was immersed for sixty seconds. In the
second trial a hand was immersed for ninety seconds but for the last
thirty seconds the temperature of the water was gradually raised by one
degree, from fourteen to fifteen degrees Celsius.44 Afterward the
subjects were asked which experiment they would be more willing to
repeat. A majority reported a preference for repeating the longer trial.45
In effect, although undergoing the same period of intense discomfort the
subjects recalled them differently due to an additional period of
discomfort that was slightly less intense. The subjects tended to ignore
the duration of the discomfort and to respond to the average level.
One final observation is in order before examining whether
happiness as a factor in regulatory measures will improve the existing
analysis. There is a strong tendency to think in terms of increasing
happiness in association with addressing unmet needs or wants. In a
sense, there is a gap between what one has and what one wants, with the
solution being to close the gap by acquiring more of what one wants or
needs. In fact, decreasing the amount of desire can also close the gap.
From the perspective of Zen philosophy 46 or, perhaps, even common
41 Daniel Kahneman et al., Toward National Well-Being Accounts, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 429,
430-32 (2004).
42 Kahneman et al., supra note 17, at 386-87. In fact, Kahneman and his coauthors identify
six ways of assessing happiness. The authors offer an example of two toasters, one of which
delivers a shock when it is used. One morning the owner uses one toaster and receives a shock.
This is experienced utility. If the information is used the next morning in choosing one toaster
over another, decisional utility is relevant. Id. at 376.
43 Id. at 375-76.
44 Id. at 386.
45 Id.
46 See David Burton, Knowledge and Liberation: Philosophical Ruminations on a Buddhist
Conundrum, 52 PHIL. E. & W. 326 (2002); see also Christina Feldman, The Four Noble Truths:
Path of Transformation, in VOICES OF INSIGHT 103 (Sharon Salzberg ed., 1999).
[Vol. 32:62376
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sense, another means of reducing unhappiness or increasing happiness
is simply to want less. 47 All of this may seem idealistic or unrealistic,
but even from day to day events, most people know that wanting less
does relieve stress. Practically everyone has had the experience of
wanting something very badly, not getting it, and then completely
forgetting about it or even wondering why he or she wanted it in the
first place. This type of contentment or happiness is distinguishable
from the concepts of hedonic adaptation and relative deprivation. In the
case of happiness through wanting less, the person knows what is
possible but simply appreciates what he or she has.
II. HAPPINESS AND REGULATORY STANDARDS
The notion of regulatory standards is a broad one. Here, the
emphasis is on the basic rationales for regulation. Traditionally, they
relate to cases in which there is market failure-potential efficiencies
are not realized-or instances in which society simply does not like the
outcome, whether it is a result of market failure or a collective sense of
right and wrong. The casebook on which Paul Verkuil, Tom Morgan,
and I collaborated listed four rationales: natural monopoly, excessive
competition, transaction costs, and inherently scarce resources. 48  If
happiness could be equated with cost/benefit analysis, one would have
to conclude-paraphrasing a popular book on the topic of happiness 49 -
that regulators have, at most, stumbled upon happiness rather than
having carried out a conscious effort to regulate in ways that promote
it. But this sidesteps the question of the usefulness of a conscious
effort.
The reason why regulators may have only stumbled on happiness
is that cost/benefit analysis is not the same as a happiness/unhappiness
analysis. The reasons for the difference are fairly well understood.
First, many factors that lead to happiness are not expressed in traditional
markets. Love, a sense of security, self-esteem, and the capacity to
appreciate a clear starry night are examples. Second, markets only
reflect the willingness and ability of participants to pay. Or, more
directly, costs and benefits are valuations that are set by market
participants. If one is unable to participate due to a lack of funds, a
cost/benefit analysis will not detect the extent to which some things-
warm clothes, a vacation-may increase happiness. Third, even if
47 For a study of this possibility, see Jeff T. Larsen & Arnie R. McKibban, Is Happiness
Having What You Want, Wanting What You Have, or Both?, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 371 (2008).
48 See Harrison, Morgan & Verkuil, supra note 4, at 121.
49 GILBERT, supra note 8.
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cost/benefit analysis were consistent with happiness, it would have to be
applied consistently. This is hardly the case. Some regulation is guided
by cost/benefit analysis and some is not.50
Aside from these factors, what do we know about wealth and
happiness in the United States? First, studies indicate that overall
happiness in the United States has fallen, while overall wealth has
increased, in the latter quarter of the twentieth century.5 Thus, to the
extent cost/benefit analysis has been successfully employed, it has
either not promoted happiness or its effects have been offset by other
factors. Curiously, during this period income inequality has
increased, 52 but happiness inequality has actually declined.53 At the
very least, this means that much more is going on when it comes to
happiness than income and wealth.
A focus on overall wealth, cost/benefit analysis, or even income
distribution misses the mark. Unfortunately, it is probably impossible
to know by how much and why or even what the "mark" is or should
be. Still, whatever the limitation of cost/benefit analysis, it must be
considered in light of the controversies described above concerning how
one measures happiness, whether set point theory is correct, and when
happiness is determined. Ultimately, the question becomes whether
what we know about happiness can be sufficiently trusted and applied to
refine and change cost/benefit-based regulation. Examining the
standard rationales for regulation may help in this inquiry.
A. The Natural Monopoly Rationale
The bedrock economic rationale for regulation is natural
monopoly. These are instances in which demand can be most
efficiently met by a single firm. The problem is that to experience the
productive efficiencies of natural monopoly, one would have to tolerate
monopoly pricing for goods or services that may be regarded as
50 Two excellent examples are the standards applied in the famous snail darter case, Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), and legislation applied to those with disabilities.
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
51 David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being over Time in Britain and the
USA, 88 J. PUB. EcON. 1359 (2004); Easterlin, Happiness ofAll, supra note 8.
52 Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Happiness Inequality in the United States, in
HAPPINESS, supra note 9, at 33.
53 This varies widely by subgroup. For example, the differences by race and gender have
both decreased. At the same time the difference by educational level has increased. Id at 59-66.
Nevertheless, this period is generally regarded as one in which there was a great deal of
deregulation. Thus, there is an inkling of a case to be made-perhaps a hypothesis-that greater
income inequality is offset by less government control. This would require some generalized
sense by people that there is less control. It is not clear this is the case.
[Vol. 32:62378
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necessities. The policy compromise is to allow the firm to operate as a
single supplier but to regulate its prices. 54 In economic terms, the result
is both an increase in consumer surplus over what would occur under
unregulated conditions and greater productive efficiency.
Consumer surplus, a measure of welfare, is the difference between
what is paid for a good or service and the most that a consumer would
be willing to pay. In a sense, it is a psychological profit. In the case of
natural monopoly, the unregulated seller will establish a higher price
and a lower level of output.55 One might conclude that regulation of
natural monopoly pricing is actually guided by a mix of economic and
happiness concerns. The theory would be that regulation means paying
less for one product, thus allowing consumers to buy other things that
they assume will make them happier. Of course, the lower price means
less profit for those who would have received that profit and a
decreased ability to purchase things that would have made the
stakeholders possibly happier. This is all standard analysis, and without
going into great detail, we know the consumer surplus that is gained
through regulation exceeds the loss to shareholders. 56
This is, however, still a very long way from knowing the impact of
rate regulation on happiness. First, the regulation makes it possible for
consumers to purchase things that will potentially make them happier.
Second, different levels of happiness may be achieved depending on the
capacity of the consumer to enjoy the extra income. Third, even though
the consumer surplus gained by consumers may exceed the producer
surplus that is lost by stakeholders, there is no way to know if the
increased experienced utility of ratepayers exceeds the decreased
experienced utility of stakeholders. 57
This last point is particularly important. The most potent criticism
of the economic analysis is that it equates the concept of value and the
process of making a choice with utility. Value, though, requires that
individuals be able to register their choices in the market, and choices
can turn out to be disappointing. Thus, even if one settles on utility as
the proper measure of efficiency, the conventional view is that it is
decisional utility at work.58 The ability to measure and make decisions
on the basis of experienced utility would change the process
54 See Harrison, Morgan & Verkuil, supra note 4, at 250-53.
55 Id. at 125-28.
56 The textbook version of this argues that monopolies not only shift income from consumers
to owners of the monopoly but cause a net loss in welfare as well.
57 This is not a reference to the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility. Utility, as
commonly used these days, is about expectations. And, while comparison of expectations of
increased or decreased utility cannot be made, the same may not be true about experienced utility.
58 See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
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significantly in many contexts and the regulation of natural monopolies
is no different.
So where does this leave us with respect to the regulation of
natural monopolies and happiness? In truth, the idea of experience
sampling as a way to guide policy with respect to natural monopolies
seems more like science fiction than anything else. Happiness theory
does not seem to hold the potential to advance the analysis. On the
other hand, a possible exception is the idea of lifeline rates. Lifeline
rates are those made available to low income people. They are typically
below the cost of production and provide a good basis on which to
compare cost/benefit analysis and at least an intuitive consideration of
happiness. From the viewpoint of standard economic analysis, rates
below the marginal cost of production are inefficient. The rationale is
that marginal cost reflects the cost of resources that are consumed in the
production of one more unit of output. A price below that cost reflects
the fact that the value to the buyer is less than the cost of the resources
consumed. 59 More technically, a price this low is allocative
inefficiency. 60 On the other hand, a rate below cost may very well be
"efficient" from the standpoint of happiness. In short, happiness fills
the gap between value, as expressed in the market, and a more inclusive
sense of experienced welfare.
Perhaps this is only a new way of articulating known concerns.
But if this is the conclusion, it is not unimportant. Unless the
outpouring of scholarship on happiness can be used to inform policy
and regulation in some manner, it is of interest but is not terribly
relevant. Nevertheless, what happiness tells us is that traditional
ratemaking in the context of natural monopolies may only scratch the
surface with respect to experienced utility and actual happiness. The
capacity to pay may be but one consideration in pricing decisions. At
the very least, a closer examination lends increased support for lifeline
rates by suggesting that a conventional efficiency assessment is
unnecessarily narrow.
B. The Excessive Competition Rationale
The excessive competition rationale has always seemed like an odd
basis for regulation. Competition means lower prices and survival of
59 The economic loss is offset by cross-subsidization from other ratepayers or other means of
public support.
60 Allocative efficiency is achieved when resources are drawn into the production of goods
that are most valued. It is important to remember that value in this context is registered by a
willingness and ability to pay.
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the most efficient competitors. On what basis can protecting less
efficient competitors from others be supported? Does the addition of a
happiness element change the analysis? The question is complicated by
a number of factors. The first is that the motivation for protecting
competitors is not always clear, and it is likely that those seeking
protection have a great deal of influence in the decision. Second, in the
case of either regulation or deregulation, success, in terms of happiness
or even measures of efficiency is impossible, except in extreme
examples, to assess. For example, in the case of deregulation, the only
true test of success would require a comparison of the current
deregulated state of an industry and what it would have been like had
regulation continued. In short, can an examination of happiness
enhance the analysis when the rationale for the regulation is difficult to
define, the regulation may be the result of capture, and measures of
success are elusive?
This question is probably unanswerable across the board.
Regulation and deregulation have affected everything from
transportation to financial markets. Indeed, to the extent deregulation of
financial markets contributed to the recent financial collapse, it would
be hard to view deregulation as consistent with happiness. On the other
hand, it is not obvious how a happiness-analysis could have been
applied. Perhaps all that can be said is that it could not have made
things worse.
To the extent deregulation and abandonment of an excessive
competition rationale is thought to be economically superior to a
regulatory state, the conventional measure of success would be in terms
of prices and output-both quantity and quality. 61 As noted throughout
this Article, the equation of happiness with so-called superior economic
outcomes is not at all clear. But this analysis can work in a variety of
ways. For example, a deregulatory effort that could be viewed as an
economic failure may still be a happiness success. The opposite is true
as well-an economic success may be a happiness failure.
Airline deregulation, in particular, illustrates the problems of
applying a consistent happiness approach. Although based on personal
observation and experience, it seems self-evident that today's airline
travelers do not find the experience an enjoyable one. In fact, as early
61 There are mixed reviews of airline deregulation. See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY &
ANDREW R. GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE MYTHOLOGY (1992); STEVEN
MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION
(1986); William N. Evans & loannis Kessides, Structure, Conduct, and Performance in the
Deregulated Airline Industry, 59 So. ECON. J. 450 (1993); Alfred E. Kahn, Surprises of Airline
Deregulation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 316 (1988). In reality it is impossible to label any regulatory
effort a success because it is impossible to perform a controlled experiment that compares today's
outcomes with the outcomes under a modem regulatory regime.
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as 1989, Alfred Kahn, the chief architect of airline deregulation
observed:
Most of us probably did not foresee the deterioration in the average
quality of the flying experience, and in particular the congestion
and delays that have plagued air travelers in recent years.
Fortunately, an audience of economists will readily understand
how little this failure constitutes a legitimate criticism of de-
regulation. 62
Kahn's comments were written in 1989, well in advance of the
additional inconveniences resulting from the September 11th attacks.
Still, what it tells, in only a bit more than a single word, is that
competition is not always pretty. Lower prices, lower costs of
production, etc., may mean a higher probability of business failures, job
losses if consolidations occur, and the types of qualitative discomforts
Kahn describes.
Would an assessment of experienced happiness make a difference?
What makes this question difficult is not simply that we have no readily
accepted metric of happiness but that this is happiness that would not
reveal itself in the market. Nevertheless, sophisticated modeling should
be able to predict outcomes that people generally find unpleasant. This
does, however, reveal a further complication. To the extent the lines do
not get shorter and crowding in airplane cabins does not decline, but
people report, as they recently did,63 that they are less unhappy, the
question is whether they would behave as set point theorists 64 predict
and find that they were as happy as they ever were.
When it comes to deregulation, airline deregulation is
distinguished from most other deregulation-energy, communications,
transportation-because the end user is less a direct participant. In
these cases, the issue of happiness is probably less relevant. Although
quality of service may suffer, for the most part the goods are fungible
and readily available. The happiness issues are linked to the impact on
happiness of changes in productive efficiency and competition among
winners and losers. An examination may not reveal much more than a
standard cost/benefit analysis would.
62 Kahn, supra note 61, at 320.
63 Susan Carey, North American Airline-Passenger Satisfaction Improves, WALL ST. J., June
8, 2010, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/airline-passenger-satisfaction-improves-
2010-06-08-7400.
64 See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
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C. Reacting to Transaction CostS65
When market outcomes are either not efficient or are otherwise
unacceptable, transaction costs are often the problem. The mix of
regulations when this is the case can, for the most part, be put into three
categories. First are instances in which an industry is rationalized. This
term refers to the process of assigning property rights or setting
standards. An example might be assigning fishing rights. 66 The second
category concerns the availability of information. Examples range from
nutritional information on foods to licensing requirements for
professions. For example, requiring a person to pass a bar exam before
holding oneself out as an attorney 67 is a form of providing information
about that person's qualifications that might not otherwise be available.
In effect, information is provided-this person has completed a certain
amount of legal training and passed an exam designed to test his or her
capacity to provide legal guidance. Third, there are instances in which
transactions are not permitted at all because the exchange is on balance
inefficient and, even with complete information, the market solution is
not satisfactory. Put differently, because of transaction costs and free-
rider problems the distaste for activity cannot be accurately reflected in
the market. Banning the sale of a dangerous explosive would fall into
this category. 68
1. Happiness and Transaction Costs: The Marlboro Feeling
In some instances it seems clear that utility, as commonly used,
and happiness or experienced utility are quite close to each other, and
this is reflected in a regulation. For example, in a very detailed analysis
of the costs and benefits of regulations designed to limit smoking by
young people, the Food and Drug Administration noted that,
"[c]onsumers would incur costs to the extent that they lose positive
utility received from the imagery embodied in product advertising
65 It is important to distinguish the cost of a good or service from a transaction cost.
66 See, e.g., New York v. Evans, 162 F. Supp. 2d 161 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
67 This does not mean the assessment itself is without controversy. See Amendments to the
Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar, 843 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2003).
68 An example is the prohibition on the manufacture and sale of "lawn darts." 16 CFR §§
1306.1-1306.5 (2003). The prohibition of certain transactions reflects a paternalistic tendency in
regulation. One critical distinction is between allowing transactions to occur in light of full
disclosure and banning certain transactions all together. For more on this, see HARRISON &
THEEUWES, supra note 18, at 346-47.
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campaigns." 69 Here the idea is that the actual experience of smoking or
the experience of making a purchase will be less enjoyable in fact and
not only as anticipated.
What is interesting about this example is that it illustrates the
limitations of both standard cost/benefit analysis and an experienced
happiness approach. With respect to cost/benefit analysis, under a strict
reading of the discussion, it leaves open the possibility that positive
imagery resulting from advertising could be great enough to reject a rule
that would reduce smoking and harm to children. There are two
problems with this. The idea that pain, suffering, death and a possibly
massive use of health care resources resulting from cigarette smoking
can be weighed against positive imagery will strike most as silly, at
best. What is missing is any sense of lexical ordering70- the idea that
not all values can be reduced to a common denominator. In addition,
the implication is that the tobacco industry could have avoided the
limitations on advertising if it had been more adept at creating positive
imagery.
Would an experienced happiness approach be free of these
objections? In some versions it might be. For example, those who are
sick or facing eminent death could be asked if they would do it again or
how much they would pay to avoid their own premature death or that of
a loved one. In short, the analysis would be based on actual experience.
This approach, however, raises most of the limitations of happiness
analysis. For example, a suffering person may have little recollection of
the actual pleasure or experienced utility resulting from smoking. Or, if
set point theory applies, one may adjust somewhat to the thought of
premature death and report that they are actually currently happy.
Perhaps more importantly, the decision raises both versions of the "is
happiness the only thing?" discussion. In one version, subjective
happiness must be modified to include those things that are prudent. In
amother version, subjective self-interest is to be modified by capability
concerns.
In the context of the cigarette distribution and promotion policies,
both of these concerns come to bear. For example, if we agree that
prudent people do not smoke, then the lost imagery cost may be a non-
factor. In fact, no matter how powerful it might be, it can be argued that
no amount of imagery can offset the threat to one's life. As for the
capability question, the idea that a smoker reports that he or she enjoys
69 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (proposed Aug. 11, 1995) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803-804, 897).
70 See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and
Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1331-33 (1986).
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smoking may not be all that should be considered. If smoking has
debilitating effects, the issue of capability becomes relevant.
2. Happiness and Transaction Costs
Stated most succinctly, there are two gaps between cost/benefit
analysis and happiness analysis. The first is the use of market
transactions as a measure of utility. This problem has already been
explored.7' The second is a result of information shortages. The search
for information is a transaction cost, and information, as a good, is
probably produced at suboptimal levels. There are two reasons for this.
One is that information may be subject to free riding problems. In
effect, generally useful information is hard to keep private or, more
technically, the producers of information are unable to fully internalize
its benefits. 2 Second, some information is not produced because the
lowest cost producer of that information is better off if the information
remains unknown. 73
The information shortage in the case of implementing an
experienced utility approach to regulation is best understood in the
context of the ideal. Under ideal conditions, choices made would be
most consistent with happiness if individuals, as buyers or sellers, could
visit the future and experience their utility before committing. 74 In
effect, they could be asked after the fact what the experience was worth
to them. This does not, however, resolve the problem that those unable
to pay would report lower amounts even though their experienced utility
may exceed that of those reporting a willingness to pay more.
Still, while literally impossible to visit the future, there are some
surrogates. First, "cooling off' periods do allow one to experience for a
short period of time how it actually feels to make a purchase. 75 In a
sense, buyers are able to say how much they are willing to pay after the
experience by keeping or returning goods about which they are
unenthused. Second, when purchases are made, the purchasers may be
71 See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
72 The best examples involve intellectual property, where there is legislation designed to
allow internalization.
73 There are other types of information that may be generally useful-product comparisons-
but not protectable; for example, producers do not provide information that will make products
less attractive to consumers unless they are required to or it is necessary to avoid liability.
Additionally, good information enhances competition, which means lower prices and higher
levels of output.
74 In effect, the transaction costs associated with this information are infinitely high.
75 Possibly the best-known cooling-off period is that applied by the Federal Trade
Commission to door-to-door sales. It allows consumers to change their minds within three days.
See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(a) (2008).
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attempting to repeat an experience. In effect their decisional utility is
heavily based on experienced utility. Finally, more information and
more focused information can engage a purchaser's imagination to the
point that decisional utility can be close to that experienced. None of
these measures solve the problem of the slippage between happiness
and preferences as expressed in markets. Nevertheless, they can mean
that even the individual whose market participation is limited can make
choices that will be more in line with what will then be experienced.
Even this, however, may be too rosy a picture. Providing
information can take a variety of forms. Information about how one
will feel if he or she buys a product can encourage purchases that are
imprudent in the view of happiness theorists. Moreover, sometimes the
information itself or how it is presented can be the source of happiness.
The question is whether the happiness generated by the way in which
the information is presented is consistent with a legitimate happiness
goal. And as has been shown, there really is a phenomenon of too much
information. 76
Nevertheless, the most realistic implementation of happiness
teaching may come in the form of information regulation and
disclosures. Discovering the types of information that enrich decisional
utility so that it is as consistent as possible with experienced utility may
be the greatest contribution possible.
This type of information could reflect the experienced utility of
others as determined by surveys like those explored by surveys like
those explored by Daniel Kahneman and others and accurate reports of
efforts by those having the experience to repeat it. In fact, the first step
would be to determine the validity and reliability of experience
sampling as a means of predicting the happiness experienced by others.
This is probably not a process to be entrusted to those in the industry.
Anyone familiar with the U.S. News & World Report survey of law
schools and its effects understands the moral hazard of allowing those
affected by surveys to self-report information. Nevertheless, the
importance of both experience sampling and day reconstruction should
not be discounted as important sources of information that can decrease
the divide between decisional and experienced utility.
76 See Shmeul I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68
LA. L. REV. 117 (2007); Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994).
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D. The Allocation ofInherently Scarce Resources:
Concluding Remarks
The final category of regulation includes those that allocate
inherently scarce resources. These are resources that cannot be
reproduced. 77 The focus here has shifted over the years. At one point,
the idea was that broadcast frequencies were inherently scarce78 and air
and water were what economists call free goods. We now know that air
and water are not free goods; there is not enough of either of sufficient
quality to satisfy all demanders. Under this category, two concerns are
evident. One is that depletion may occur. This is reflected in actions
ranging from regulatory limitations on industrial emissions to quotas on
fishing and hunting. If this were the only concern, at least in theory, the
limited amounts of these resources that could be consumed could be
subject to an auction and allocated to the highest bidders. This is
represented by so-called cap and trade programs, which limit emissions
amounts and leave the market to allocate the rights to pollute. 79 The
second concern is that an allocation by auction may not be socially
desirable. For example, in Alaska legislation exists to ensure that
subsistence users have priority in terms of access to fish and game.80
This was also the original basis for the efforts to allocate broadcast
frequencies.
Rather than assessing how theories of happiness and experienced
utility might enrich the policy analysis, these examples are used to
illustrate the challenges in applying happiness theories to regulatory
matters. In the first instance-cap and trade-the questions are whether
capping can be guided by happiness and, then, whether the allocation
itself can be a function of happiness. Since both of these processes deal
with what might be regarded as "macro" concerns as opposed to
77 Another very important area of business regulation reflects a reaction to social inequities.
A good example is the Americans with Disabilities Act, which requires employers to
accommodate those with disabilities. Obviously, if the market created an incentive to do so,
legislation would not be required. Clearly, these regulations can be connected to happiness or
experienced utility that is not reflected in the market. A better rationale may be that they
represent a kind of social insurance based on an instinctive sense that each person should only
absorb a limited amount of the misfortune life can create.
78 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969).
79 See generally Michael Burger, "It's Not Easy Being Green": Local Initiatives, Preemption
Problems, and the Market Participant Exception, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 835 (2010); Dirk Forrister,
U.S. Climate Policy Implementation: Effective Use of Carbon Markets for Cost Saving, 40
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,585 (2010).
80 For examples of issues arising under Alaska's efforts to allocate fish and game, see Sophie
Thdriault et al., The Legal Protection of Subsistence: A Prerequisite of Food Security for the Inuit
ofAlaska, 22 ALASKA L. REV. 35 (2005).
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individualized assessments of happiness, the question of whether there
is anything promising in the studies of happiness that could improve the
current standards is even more difficult. There is, however, evidence of
happiness concerns in both facets of regulations of this type. Measures
taken today to cap environmental pollution are unlikely to be justified
on the basis of improving the experienced utility of those currently
alive.8' On the other hand, to the extent they reflect assumptions about
the potential experienced utility of those living in the future, those
assumptions are based on current experiences, which may or may not be
good surrogates for future experiences.
A market solution available to those currently alive is one that
discounts the happiness of those unable to participate in the market. But
even here there is evidence of a future experienced utility consciousness
found in the existence of organizations that purchase and effectively
retire pollution rights. These purchases seem to be based on a sense that
future generations will enjoy a more pleasant existence if air and water
are clean, as defined by current measures. In short, these efforts seem
to preserve the experienced (or to be experienced) happiness of future
generations. But there is an important question here that points out the
limitations of applying happiness in this context. What studies of
happiness indicate quite clearly is that the quality of an experience can
change depending upon when people assess it. More importantly,
happiness is a function of adaptations and expectations. Thus, it is
impossible to say that those living in a less pristine environment in the
future would be subjectively less happy than people living in a cleaner
environment today. In particular we know that people adapt
psychologically to what exists at the time. Moreover, today's effort to
protect future experienced utility are based in part on an assumption that
measures to improve environmental conditions will somehow remain
static.
The analysis is much the same in the case of resources that are both
limited and not subject to market allocation. The idea of allocation of
natural resources to subsistence users cannot be based on a cost/benefit
analysis. In all likelihood, the basis is moral. But it could also have an
implicit experienced-utility basis. Again, it is one that imagines that the
enjoyment of subsistence users somehow exceeds that of others. One
could design an experienced utility experiment that would test this
assumption and the possibility that it is wrong. But that simply raises
another issue that shadows happiness analysis: Is happiness all that
matters?
81 That is not to say that there is no experienced utility associated with the action of limiting
environmental degradation or the knowledge that future generations may have a more pleasant
time of it.
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CONCLUSION
Recent revelations about happiness or experienced utility make for
fascinating reading and lead to science fiction-like possibilities for our
regulatory future. Applying these teachings means narrowing the gap
between decisional utility and experienced utility. They can never be
the same, but the most promising possibility lies in increasing the
availability of information that enriches the decision-making process.
Information about the experienced utility of others as evidenced by
repeated behaviors or actual experimentation may hold the greatest
promise for closing the gap.

